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NOTES
RUTH E. BATES, who writes on REPUTATION OF THE VICTIM
ON THE ISSUE OF SELF-DEFENSE IN MISSOURI, is a graduate
of the School of Law and a member of the St. Louis Bar. She
was a member of the LAW REVIEW staff from 1926-1928.
HUGO J. GRIMM is a former judge of the Circuit Court and a
member of the St. Louis Bar. He writes on INVESTMENT OF
TRUST FUNDS IN MISSOURI in this issue and has contributed
to THE REVIEW on several prior occasions.
DANIEL L. BRENNER, contributor of THE LIABILITY OF AN
OWNER OF A VEHICLE WHEN, DUE TO His NEGLIGENCE, His
GUEST IS INJURED, is a member of the Kansas City, Missouri,
Bar.
SAMUEL BRECKENRIDGE NOTE PRIZE AWARDS
Daniel A. Macpherson's note on "The Problem of the Non-resi-
dent Transient Motorist" has been awarded the fifteen dollar
prize as the best note in the first issue of the current volume.
The award for the best note in the second issue has been made
to Joseph Nessenfeld. He wrote on "Survival of Causes for Per-
sonal Injuries and Related Wrongs in Missouri."
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATING PAYMENTS BY UTILI-
TIES TO HOLDING COMPANIES
The modern tendency in financial circles is the formation of
holding companies for a group of related industries. This is es-
pecially true in the public utility field. The relationship be-
tween the holding company and the utility is of special impor-
tance in connection with its effect on the return the utility earns
or is entitled to earn, and hence upon the rate that the public
must pay. Payments to the holding company appear as an oper-
ating expense, and have caused much worry to the commissions
when trying to determine whether the utility is entitled to an in-
crease in rate. The problem that arises in this situation is well
stated by Professor Ripley in his book, MAIN STREET AND WALL
STEET:1 "The last serious indictment against the over-develop-
ed holding corporation in the public utility field has to do with
rate regulation. Under the terrific involution of accounts it
may become practically impossible to allocate costs and to deter-
mine earnings as related to the investment. The holding com-
pany is exposed to the temptation to exploit its subsidiaries,
taking its own profit by undue enhancement of the operating ex-
'(1927), p. 309.
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penses of the local concerns.2  . . . How easy for the inter-
state holding companies to dilute earnings in order that they
may become digestible in the public view, and how difficult in a
massive hierachy of such holding companies to trace anything
like costs in relation to investment back to some solid bench
mark. How difficult to pass upon the reasonableness of con-
tracts for the use of property or the sale of power. . . . For-
mal proceedings degenerate under such circumstances into a
mere muzz of words."
In order to get a clear picture of just how the holding com-
pany has an opportunity to take its profit by undue enhancement
of the operating expenses of the local concern, it would be well to
consider the so called licensee contract which the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. has with each of its subsidiaries.
A Co., incorporated in New York, is the parent organization
and owns most of the common stock of its subsidiaries. X Co., a
Missouri corporation, is one of the latter. By the licensee con-
tract X Co. is to pay 4 2 per cent.3 of its gross revenue to A Co.
which in turn licenses X Co. to use certain patented telephone
instruments; the A Co. further agrees to carry on experiments
looking toward improvements in the instruments and service, to
give X Co. the benefit of such improvements, to defend X Co. in
any patent litigation, to aid in financing X Co. at reasonable
terms, to act as a central purchasing department, and to give
advice in developing the efficiency of X Co. The A Co.'s under-
taking does not include payment of taxes on the instruments
which it furnishes; these are paid by the X Co. Now suppose
that in the year 1926 the gross revenue of X Co. was $20,000,000.
On this basis the payment to A Co. would be $900,000; and out
of this $20,000,000 must come the actual operating expenses
such as wages, materials, supplies, current taxes, plus a fair re-
turn upon valuation of the property and an allowance for de-
preciation. For the purpose of this example, let us place the
fair return at $4,100,000, depreciation $2,000,000, and actual
operating charges $13,000,000.
Suppose then that in 1927, there had been an increase in cost
of material and wages, so that actual operating expenses are$16,000,000 instead of $13,000,000. Clearly X Co. would be en-
titled to an increase in rates to bring in enough to cover this in-
creased cost of operation. But it would also have to pay more
to A Co. under its contract because gross revenue would be in-
creased. If after the increase, X Co. earned $23,000,000, the
debit sheet would show: depreciation, $2,000,000 (same as be-
2 Italics are writer's.
'Beginning January, 1929-the charge is only 1% % but the same prin-
ciples underlie although the effects are not so glaring even though still there.
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fore) ; actual operating expenses, $16,000,000; payment under
licensee contract, $1,035,000; return on value of property,
$3,965,000-$135,000 less than it earned the year before and
which was found to be what it was legally entitled to earn.
Therefore the rates must be increased to provide for the deficit.
But it is to be noted that the payment to A Co.was increased by
$185,000 without showing any increase in the cost of the service to
A Co. or in the benefit to X Co. Nor may this increase in payment
be interpreted as a reward for efficiency brought about by the sup-
ervision by A Co. If based upon net returns it might well re-
flect efficiency in management, but it is not. It is based on gross
revenue, and whenever this is increased, no matter for what rea-
son, there is an increase in payment to A Co. under the contract,
even though the increase in gross revenue has no relation to the
service performed by A Co. There is likely to be an exploitation
of X Co. by A Co. at the expense of the public.
No one would doubt but what A Co. is entitled to something
for its service. But certainly the payment under the licensee
contract does not represent the true value of the service, when it
can be affected by such forces as those given in the hypothetical
situation. Yet the Supreme Court of the United States has re-
peatedly upheld this type of contract.4 In State of Missouri ex
rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion" the court in speaking of the contract said: "Four and one-
half per cent is the ordinary charge paid voluntarily by local
companies of the general system. There is nothing to indicate
bad faith. So far as appears, plaintiff in error's board of direc-
tors has exercised proper discretion about this matter requiring
business judgment. . . . The applicable general rule is well
expressed in State Public Utilities Commission ex rel. Spring-
field v. Springfield Gas and Electric Company, 291 Ill. 209, 234.
The Commission is not the financial manager of the corporation;
it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
directors of the corporation; nor can it ignore items charged by
the utility as operating expenses unless there is an abuse of dis-
cretion in that regard by the corporate officers." This case has
generally been considered as limiting the power of commissions
to reduce the amount of payment under the licensee contracts to
cases where bad faith is shown.6
' City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell (1921), 259 U. S. 318; State of
Mo. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission(1923), 262 U. S. 216, 31 A. L. R. 80.
'See note 3, supra.
'Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. R. R. Commission of S. C. (1923),
299 F. 615; Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission(1924), 300 F. 190, 204; Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Whitman
(1925), 3 F. (2d) 938, 956; Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Spillman
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In the case of Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Spillman,7
the court held that there is a presumption that such licensee con-
tracts have been entered into in good faith and within the direc-
tors' proper discretion, and that to overcome this, the commis-
sion must show that it was not made within the proper discre-
tion. The opinion further points out that if an unreasonable
charge has been imposed on the utility, that would be a circum-
stance to show an abuse of discretion; but if the charge has been
reasonable then it cannot be omitted merely because of the inter-
corporate relation. Going back to our supposed case. How
could the Missouri Commission show that the charge is unrea-
sonable? The Commission itself is not in possession of sufficient
information and it cannot compel A Co. to furnish the books and
information as to the cost of the service to it.8 And A Co., being
a New York corporation, is not within the jurisdiction of the
Commission, so no subpoena duces tecum could be issued.
Of course, X Co. is within the jurisdiction and its books might
be subpoenaed, but those books would help very little, because
they would show neither the cost of the service to A Co. nor the
benefit to X Co. But in proceedings before the commissions,
before controversies have been brought into court, the com-
missions have been inclined to throw upon the utilities the bur-
den of showing that the rates are reasonable.9 The basis for
this is that the utility is in a better position to furnish the infor-
mation than the commission, since the utility could get sufficient
information from the parent company. But suppose that the
X Co. should make a showing of reasonableness, how could the
commission dispute it?
In Re NeW York Teleph. Co.20 it was held that the refusal of
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company to furnish the
(1925), 6 F. (2d) 663; Citizens Gas Co. of Hannibal v. Public Service Com-
mission (1925), 8 F. (2d) 632; State of Kansas ex rel. Hopkins v. South-
western Bell Teleph. Co. (1924), 115 Kans. 236, 223 P. 771; Michigan
Utility Commission v. Michigan State Teleph. Co. (1924), 228 Mich. 658,
670; re Northern States Power Co. (N. D.) P. U. R. 1924A 325, 346; re New
England Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Me.) P. U. R. 1926B 247; re Indiana
Bell Telephone Co. (Ind.) P. U. R. 1926C 785, 800; re New England Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. (N. H.) P. U. R. 1926E 186.
' (1925), 6 F. (2d) 663; accord, Re Wisconsin Telephone Co. (Wis.) P.
U. R. 1925D 661, 675.
'Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. R. R. Commission of S. C. (1923), 299 F.
615; Chesapeake & Potomac Teleph. Co. v. Whitman (1925), 3 F. (2d) 938,
but see Re Wisconsin Teleph. Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. 1927a 581; where parent
company was required to show cost of service.
'Chesapeake & Potomac Teleph. Co. v. Whitman (1925), 3 F. (2d) 938;
Northern States Power Co. (N. D.) P. U. R. 1924A 325, 346; re New York
Teleph. Co. (N. Y.) P. U. R. 1925C 767, 818 et seq.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/6
NOTES
information as to the cost of the service amounted to the refusal
of the utility; was the result that the petitioner was de-
clared not to have made out that the increase in rates predicated
in part on the payments to the parent company was just and
reasonable." This suggests the possibility of considering the
parent and subsidiary companies as one. It is hard to set up
any fixed rule as to when the corporate entity will be disregard-
ed. The courts have been vague and uncertain in discussing
this. However, it may be said that where stock ownership is
resorted to not for the purpose of participating in the affairs of
the corporation in the customary and usual manner, but for the
purpose of controlling the subsidiary company so that it may be
used as a mere adjunct, agency, or instrumentality of the owning
company, the court will not permit itself to be blinded by mere
corporate form, but will in a proper case disregard the corporate
entity and treat the two corporations as one.12 But what is a
proper case? Mere ownership of all of the stock is not suf-
ficient. -3 But the identity of stockholders, the method of con-
ducting corporate business as a separate concern or- as a mere
department of the other concern, the manner of keeping books,
all may be evidential facts to be considered as bearing on the
question of whether the corporate entity should be disregarded.
But after all, it comes down to a question of whether the corpor-
ate entity is being used in good faith and honesty and for legit-
imate ends.' 4
There are many cases in which the corporate entity has been
disregarded. In Luchenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co.15
the Luchenbach Co. was held liable for the debts of the Luch-
enbach S. S. Co. The Luchenbach Co. owned 90 per cent. of the
stock of the Steamship Co. Further it owned all the vessels which
had been leased to the Steamship Co. The latter company has
incorporated only for $10,000, which, of course, did not any-
P. U. R. 1925C 767, 818.
See also Re Wisconsin Telephone Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. 1927A 581 where
burden was put on parent company to make showing of cost.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n
(1918), 247 U. S. 490, 501. Also see Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity
of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. REv. 12, 17; I. Maurice
Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COL. L. REV. 496.
N. Y. Airbrake Co. v. International Steam Pump Co. (1909), 64 Misc.
(N. Y.) 347, 190 N. Y. S. 683; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. v. Minneapolis Civic
& Commerce Ass'n (1917), 247 U. S. 500; Radio-Craft Co., Inc. et al v.
Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. (1925), 7 F. (2d) 432; McCaskill Co. v.
U. S. (1910), 216 U. S. 504; U. S. v. Milwaukee, etc. Co. (1905), 142 F. 247.
"Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corpo-
rations, 14 CAL. L. REV. 12, 19.
(1920), 267 F. 676.
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where approach the value of the ships used. The court held that
the Luchenbach Co. was equally responsible with the Steamship
Co. for the latter's breach of contract, saying: "For all practical
purposes the two concerns are one."
In U. S. v. United Shoe Machinery Co. et al.'0 three companies
were joined as defendants, a Maine company, a New Jersey com-
pany, and a New Jersey corporation. Motions to dismiss as to
the two latter companies were refused, it appearing that the en-
tire capital stock of the Maine company was owned by the New
Jersey company and 982 per cent. of the stock of that company
was owned by the New Jersey corporation, and that both com-
panies were under the absolute control of the New Jersey cor-
poration. The court says: "The acts of one are the acts of all
these corporations, in fact it may truthfully be said that they are
the acts of the United Shoe Machinery Corporation. This being
so they are properly joined as defendants."
The case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minne-
sota Civic Association17 also presents another situation where
the corporate entity was disregarded. The court says: "Satis-
fied as we are by the evidence that the Eastern Company is a
completely controlled agency of the two companies which own
its capital stock, we agree with the Supreme Court of Minnesota
that the fact that the legal title to what are obviously terminal or
spur delivery tracks is in the Eastern Company should not be
permitted to become the warrant for permitting a charge upon
the shipper greater than they would be required to pay if that
(title) were in the owning companies." In this case the East-
ern Company was entirely controlled by the Omaha and Mil-
waukee companies. These latter two companies elected the
board of directors, and dictated the policies of the Eastern Co.
The Omaha and Milwaukee companies were the only two rail-
roads operating over the terminal, yet there was a charge for
terminal services, which if furnished by the owning companies
would have been much less.' 8
If the parent company and all its subsidiary utilities should
be considered as one company, then it would be possible to take
the cost of furnishing the service to the whole system and dis-
tribute it among the various subsidiaries so that each one would
bear its just proportion of the costs. This would be the only
fair and just way to arrive at a proper payment. The various
(1916), 234 F. 177.
(1917), 247 U. S. 490.
'For some other cases see Specht v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. (1923),
154 Minn. 314, 191 N. W. 905; Algot Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario
Power Co. (1916), 134 Minn. 209, 158 N. W. 979; The Anglaize Box Board
Co. v. Hinton et al (1919), 100 Oh. St. 505.
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state commissions would have jurisdiction over the parent com-
pany and could require it to produce the books. These books
could be examined to ascertain what the cost of work done by the
parent company is, and then such cost could be prorated among
the subsidiaries according to what their just proportion should
be. But just there is the rub. If the industry is large as in the
case of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. then with
forty-nine regulating bodies it would be practically impossible
to reach a proper apportionment of such expenses. The result
would be that the contributions authorized to go to the parent
company might not cover the expense, or it might be more than
the expenses, either of which would leave the situation in as un-
certain a condition as the payments under the present licensee
contract. Perhaps it is this possibility that has led the Supreme
Court to adopt what might be termed the "hands off" policy that
it enunciated in the Southwestern Bell and Houston cases.',
This very question came up in the case of Chesapeake and Po-
tomac Telephone Co. v. Whitman .20 The Maryland Commission
in a proceeding before it2I had declared that the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. was the real party in interest, because
it owned 100 per cent of the common or voting stock of Maryland
Company and controlled the Maryland Company so that the lat-
ter was a mere agent, existing and having being only by the
grace of the American Company. Further the Maryland Com-
mission took the view that since the Associated Companies of
the Bell System were considered as a whole for the benefit and
purposes of the owners, they ought to be considered as a whole
when the interests of subscribers are at stake. Upon this basis
the commission appraised the value of the property of the Amer-
ican Company within its jurisdiction and added it to that of the
Chesapeake and Potomac Company in order to arrive at a rate
base. Upon an appeal to the Federal court, the commission was
reversed as to this point, the court saying that it was inclined to
agree with the commission, but that the theory had been disap-
proved in the Southwestern Bell case and the Houston case.
The attitude of the Maryland Commission is appealing but
due to the exigency of the situation, it is submitted that the
Supreme Court is right in refusing to sanction such procedure
by the state commissions. The Supreme Court has not attempt-
ed to set up the ideal rule to govern the situation, but adopted
'State of Mo. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Commission (1923), 262 U. S. 276; City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. (1921), 259 U. S. 318.
(1926), 3 F. (2d) 988.
Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co.
(Md.) P. U. R. 1925B 545.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
the only course open to it in view of our dual system of govern-
ment and the problems that it raises. This is just another example
of the futility of the present double sovereignty system. It can-
not cope with a big problem of this sort. The benefits of one
nation-wide telephone system are great and in fact such a unifi-
cation is practically necessary. Then why not a federal com-
mission to regulate such a system? This brings up the consti-
tutionality of such a commission-a problem beyond the scope
of this note.
ROBT. B. SNOW, JR., '30.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The recognition of the right of privacy as a complement to the
rules of libel and slander in the field of tort law has received a
definite stimulus by a recent Kentucky case, Brents v. Morgan,
decided in 1927.1 In this case a petition alleging that defendant
caused a notice to be placed on a show window fronting on a
principal street stating that "Dr. M (plaintiff) owes an account
here of $49.67, and, if promises would pay an account, this ac-
count would have been settled long ago," was held to state a
good cause of action in tort for an unwarranted invasion of the
plaintiff's right of privacy. In the decision the court declares its
unqualified adherence to the recognition of such a right where
the actions of libel and slander are not adequate to meet such
situations.
The field of privacy, as such, is of relatively modern develop-
ment, and has been inadequately treated both in decisions and
in text-books. Nor has its scope received accurate and perma-
nent definition to meet the exigencies of a body of law in the
process of formation. The principal case defines the right as
the "right to be let alone; that is, the right to be free from un-
warranted publicity, or the right to live without unwarranted in-
terference by the public in matters with which it is not neces-
sarily concerned." "A more specific but less accurate definition
is the right to live without having one's name, picture or statue,
or that of a relative, made public against his will."'2 Con-
ceptually treated, the right is one of personal immunity and can
have no logical basis as a rule of property.
The right had little or no recognition at early common law,
and finds no mention in the classic commentaries. It was in-
volved, directly or indirectly, in a number of cases, but in none
was there a complete acceptance or rejection of the right, and
1221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967.
221 R. C. L. 1196.
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